MH 370 and UPS 6 near Dubai, 2010: Same Mishap Repeated?

When UPS 6 crashed near Dubai in the evening of September 3, 2010,  (http://www.gcaa.gov.ae/…/2010-Interim%20R.) (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UPS_Airlines_Flight_6) the crew had been in a battle for their lives for about 20 minutes. Upon first realizing cargo area temperatures were rising and that smoke and fumes were entering the cockpit, the crew made a turn towards a divert field,Continue reading “MH 370 and UPS 6 near Dubai, 2010: Same Mishap Repeated?”

MH 370: Probable Location for Search Malaysian Airlines Flight 370, Missing B777 Was Hazardous Cargo Aboard?

MH 370: Probable Location for Search Malaysian Airlines Flight 370, Missing B777 Was Hazardous Cargo Aboard? Are Cargo Safety Regulations Important for PASSENGER Aircraft Flights?  Two Levels of Safety May Mean No Level of Safety   MH 370 flight crew members witnessing an overheat in the large cargo compartments of their Boeing 777, would mostContinue reading “MH 370: Probable Location for Search Malaysian Airlines Flight 370, Missing B777 Was Hazardous Cargo Aboard?”

UPS 1354, Birmingham Runway 18, August 14, 2013: Is FAA Policy vs Procedures Inconsistency Causing A Severe Safety Risk in Commercial Aviation? “Is the Tail Wagging the Dog ?”

In the last 40 years the US FAA has spent hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars engineering safety into the nation’s commercial aviation infrastructure. This policy at the FAA has led to great success in achieving an astonishing low commercial aviation mishap rate in the US.  Moreover it has provided an example for Western Europe,Continue reading “UPS 1354, Birmingham Runway 18, August 14, 2013: Is FAA Policy vs Procedures Inconsistency Causing A Severe Safety Risk in Commercial Aviation? “Is the Tail Wagging the Dog ?””

Titan B733, Chambery France, Loss of Control, Human Factors,14 April 2012: Is Flawed Aerodynamics in UK AAIB Investigation Report?

  I believe that there is a basic flaw in the mishap investigation report by the UK AAIB. The flaw is a lack of inclusion of important take off aerodynamics procedures in the investigation, due to referencing solely the events surrounding EFB procedure errors. [Did the board seek the Safety Purpose or the Legal Purpose?Continue reading “Titan B733, Chambery France, Loss of Control, Human Factors,14 April 2012: Is Flawed Aerodynamics in UK AAIB Investigation Report?”

UPS Safety Program: Prevention or Mishap Investigation? What are the Financial Consequences of a Failed Safety Program?

Is UPS Airlines now joining the ranks of so many previously safe FAR Part 121 airlines whose safety program looks good on paper, but in the field is no longer functioning to prevent fatal mishaps? Since 1982, UPS has run UPS Airlines free of fatal mishaps. In fact the few mishaps that have occurred in the operationContinue reading “UPS Safety Program: Prevention or Mishap Investigation? What are the Financial Consequences of a Failed Safety Program?”

Asiana 214, Fatigue and In-Flight Crew Meals: Postprandial somnolence, or getting sleepy after you eat.

The more factors I consider, the fewer seem likely until I consider the human factor of fatigue. Automation? He was flying a B747 prior, plenty of automation there. San Francisco? Not all that different from dozens of international airports in the Pac Rim. CRM? Things didn’t go bad until the last few miles. New captain,Continue reading “Asiana 214, Fatigue and In-Flight Crew Meals: Postprandial somnolence, or getting sleepy after you eat.”

Asiana 214: Cultural Issues, Fatigue or a need for better Stabilized Approach and Go Around Procedures?

Culture issues, fatigue and other human factors of every type are and will continue to be amongst the most serious safety hazards, risks or challenges for the foreseeable future in commercial aviation. In the very open cultures of North America there may be a tendency to see cultural issues not only as a non-typical factor,Continue reading “Asiana 214: Cultural Issues, Fatigue or a need for better Stabilized Approach and Go Around Procedures?”

Asiana 214 Mishap, SFO, July 6, 2013: Stable Approaches & Go Around Procedures

Stabilized Approaches must be part of an Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) and not just a criteria, policy or even best practice.  Procedure means that it is a written set of steps and explanatory notes. Procedures are trained by the airline, checked by the FAA and continually verified, reviewed and updated by the FAA and theContinue reading “Asiana 214 Mishap, SFO, July 6, 2013: Stable Approaches & Go Around Procedures”

Lithium-Ion Aircraft Batteries as a Passenger and Cargo Smoke/Fire Risk

In fact three aircraft have been destroyed by fires caused by lithium ion batteries, one in 2006, two in 2010. But the FAA, NTSB and other government and official agencies categorize safety as related to passenger safety or a cargo acft only hazard and of no interest to passenger airline safety, such as the currentContinue reading “Lithium-Ion Aircraft Batteries as a Passenger and Cargo Smoke/Fire Risk”

Are “Passenger Lithium-ion Batteries” the same as “Cargo Lithium-ion Batteries?”

Recent passenger jet fires involving B787 Dreamliner have made news, but is it really new news? FAA and other regulators have dismissed the dangers of lithium-ion batteries when carried on cargo aircraft because. Why? Well, perhaps it is because fires on on cargo airline aircraft result in “no significant loss of life?” Isn’t this theContinue reading “Are “Passenger Lithium-ion Batteries” the same as “Cargo Lithium-ion Batteries?””